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ESSENTIALS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION IN THE
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN AND THE UNITED STATES
STEPHEN J. LEACOCK*
The limited liability company has proved itself a
most effective instrument for promoting commercial
prosperity in a free society ... 1
The law and practice relating to the protection of investors is of
paramount importance in both developing and developed societies. In
recent times, the limited liability company has emerged as the dominant
form of business operation, and the public company has provided the
best opportunity to the investing public for participating financially in
the business operations of its community. In order to win and retain the
confidence and trust of the investing public, therefore, effective measures
of investor protection are crucial. This article treats investor protection
primarily in relation to the purchase, sale and other dealings in the
securities of companies.
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN2
There is no counterpart to the United States Securities and Ex-
change Commission in any territory of the Commonwealth Caribbean.
The Company Laws in the Commonwealth Caribbean are patterned on
the English Companies Acts of 1862 or earlier, 3 1908,4 1929, 5 and 1948;6
as a result, the sources of investor protection in the territories are to
be found primarily in the Companies Acts7 operating therein. The Com-
panies Acts deal particularly with matters concerning the issuance of
securities, such as the requirements of prospectuses, the allotment of
shares and the issue of shares and debentures. There are very strict
*M.A., LL.M., Barrister-at-Law, Director of Company Law Program, University
of the West Indies, Barbados.
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provisions in many of the territories on civil and criminal liability for
misstatements in prospectuses making promoters, directors and other
persons who participated in the issue liable unless they can discharge
the onus of proving that they have not acted dishonestly or negligently.
UNITED STATES
Under the United States Constitution, all the powers which the
individual states have not delegated to the Federal Government remain
vested in the individual states.' Incorporation has not been delegated by
the individual states to the Federal Government, thus incorporation is a
privilege granted by each state according to its own laws. However, the
individual states do not have absolute power in relation to corporations,
the Constitution itself imposes restrictions on corporations which engage
in interstate and foreign commerce. Article 1, section 8 of the United
States Constitution enacts that "... the Congress shall have power.. . to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states..."
The regulation of interstate and foreign commerce is therefore reserved to
the Federal Government, and if, for example, a state attempts to hinder a
corporation in the execution of interstate business, such hindrance would
be unlawful, being an infringement of the commerce clause. 9
STATE LAWS
As incorporation is governed by the laws of the individual states, the
jurisdiction over the organisation and operation of companies is primarily
exercised by the several states, but there is no unanimity between the
company laws of the several states. These company laws range from simple
enabling Acts to complete statutes which introduce varying responsibility
in relation to corporate acts, and varying measures of investor protection.
Incorporators therefore tend to shop around in order to find the state with
the most advantageous laws, from their point of view, since a company
incorporated in one state can do business in other states without too much
trouble.
In fact, the various state company laws are not primarily concerned
with the rights of investors and the obligations of issuers and dealers in
company securities. The establishment and safeguarding of investors' rights
are usually left to statutes other than the company law statutes. There is
also wide variation in the strictness of the measures laid down in these
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other statutes, and they Vary from simple penal provisions designed to
punish deceit, to comprehensive measures designed to really protect the
investor. These statutes are commonly referred to as Blue Sky Laws, be-
cause they deal with the representations and schemes of promoters, which
the court in an early case found had no more basis than so many feet of
"blue sky".
Despite substantial growth in the field of local control and adminis-
tration, state regulation has not proved effective in many areas. The state
administrators and judicial officers are unable to cope with offenders who
do not comply with local requirements and make offers, by the use of the
mail system, telephone system or other means of communication in inter-
state' and foreign commerce, from states and foreign jurisdictions in which
their activities are lawful. The conflicts of law and other problems have
hindered investors in one state from obtaining redress from sellers in other
states, and have tended to render state attempts at investor protection
ineffective.
FEDERAL LAWS
The ineffectiveness of state regulation led to suggestions for compre-
hensive statutes authorising federal incorporation of companies engaged
in interstate and foreign commerce; these suggestions have not been fully
implemented, but have led to the enactment of federal security laws. The
federal scheme of investor protection is mainly found in seven statutes
covering the general field of securities and finance, and they are admin-
istered by a federal body known as the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.
Authority for the enactment of the Securities Legislation by the
Federal Government, and the jurisdiction for its application, is based upon
the constitutional grant of authority to the Federal Government over the
mails and the means of communication and transportation in interstate and
foreign commerce which was mentioned earlier.' 0 This federal legislation
was passed after a fierce debate between those who argued that preventive
legislation was not feasible nor wise, and those who considered that there
should be federal regulation based on a comprehensive model of Blue Sky
regulatory legislation. Neither of those views was accepted, and in the end,
the fundamental idea of the disclosure philosophy on which the English
Companies Act 1929 was based formed the basis of the federal legislation.
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INVESTOR PROTECTION IN COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
When a public company proposes to raise money, it usually does so
by inviting the investing public to subscribe for shares or debentures in
the company. The issue of application forms for shares or debentures to
the public is prohibited unless the forms are accompanied by a prospectus
which complies with the statutory requirements." Section 2(1) of the
Jamaica Companies Act 1965 defines a prospectus as:
any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, or other invitation,
offering to the public for subscription or purchase any shares or
debentures of a company.' 2
This is the meaning of a prospectus as far as Section 4013 of the Jamaica
Companies Act 1965 and all other sections of the Act that refer to the term
"prospectus" are concerned. 14
The information required to be given in accordance with the Com-
panies Acts is contained in section 40 of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965
and in the Third Schedule15 to that Act. The principle is that a prospectus
should give to the public a full, accurate and fair picture of the current
position, as well as the future prospects of the company. It should there-
fore disclose every material' 6 fact and contract in relation to the company.
Those who issue prospectuses are under an obligation to comply with
what has been referred to in England as the "golden rule" as to framing
prospectuses. This rule was laid down in 1860 by Kindersley V-C, 17 and
was referred to by Page-Wood V-C'8 as a "golden legacy".
Those who issue a prospectus, holding out to the public the great
advantages which will accrue to persons who will take shares in a
proposed undertaking, and inviting them to take shares on the faith
of the representations therein contained, are bound to state every-
thing with strict and scrupulous accuracy, and not only to abstain
from stating as fact that which is not so, but to omit no one fact
within their knowledge, the existence of which might in any degree
affect the nature, or extent, or quality, of the privileges and advan-
tages which the prospectus holds out as inducements to take shares.
The first prospectus issued in relation to the shares of any company
has to state the minimum subscription,19 being the sum which, in the
opinion of the directors, is necessary to provide for the purchase of any
property which shall be purchased out of the proceeds of the issue, to pay
any preliminary expenses, to repay any monies borrowed by the Company
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in respect of any of the foregoing matters, and to provide the working
capital of the company. Section 47(2)20 of the Jamaica Companies Act
1965 states that the amount so stated in the prospectus shall be reckoned
exclusive of any amount payable otherwise than in cash. This is a pre-
cautionary provision which ensures that the full sum representing the
minimum subscription is paid in to the company.
Part II of the Third Schedule 2 requires reports to be set out in the
prospectus by the auditors of the company respecting the profits or losses
of the company in each of the three preceeding financial years. The rates
of any dividends paid by the company must be shown for each class of
shares, as well as information on any class of shares for which no divi-
dends were paid for any of those three years. The report must give in-
formation as regards the assets and liabilities of the company as shown in
the last balance sheet, and if the company has any subsidiaries, the audi-
tors report must also deal with the profits and losses of the subsidiaries,
treating the total assets and liabilities of the group as a whole.22 If any of
the proceeds of the issue of the shares or debentures is to be applied
directly or indirectly to the purchase of any business or shares in any other
body corporate, a report by accountants, who must be named in the pros-
pectus, has to set out similar matters to those applying to the company.z2a
No misrepresentation of any material fact, nor any deception nor
ambiguous statements should be included in a prospectus. Members of the
public invited to join in any venture by a company through the issue of a
prospectus, should have the same opportunity of judging everything which
is material to the venture in the same manner as the promoters of the
company, or anyone else acting in its behalf.23 Under section 3924 of the
Jamaica Companies Act 1965, no prospectus may be issued unless a copy
of it is delivered to the Registrar for registration.
STATEMENT IN LIEU OF PROSPECTUS
A company which did not issue a prospectus when it was formed must
not allot any of its shares or debentures unless it files a statement in lieu
of prospectus with the Registrar. 25 The Jamaica Companies Act 1965 allows
statements in lieu of prospectus when a public company having a share
capital has been formed, and it has issued a full prospectus but has not
obtained its initial working capital on the strength of the full prospectus.2 6
Secondly, when a private company has been converted into a public com-
pany 27 (unless it prefers to issue a full prospectus).
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In Jamaica a public company having a share capital which has not
obtained its initial working capital on the strength of a prospectus is
governed by the Fourth Schedule" when it issues its statement in lieu of
prospectus. The information required to be given is almost as full as that
required in a full prospectus. The statement must be signed by every per-
son who is named in it as a director or a proposed director or by his agent,
and must be duly authorised in writing.
When a private company is converted into a public company, it must,
unless it issues a prospectus, deliver to the Registrar a statement in lieu
of prospectus for registration, within fourteen days from the date of the
special resolution of the general meeting deleting the three requirements
of section 30(1)29 of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965 from its articles.)0
This statement has to comply with the requirements of the Second Sched-
ule. 3 If unissued shares or debentures of the company are to be applied in
the purchase of a business, or in the purchase of shares in a body corpor-
ate, the reports required by Part II of the Second Schedule must be
attached to the statement.32 The other statutory requirements and provi-
sions are similar to those which apply to a statement in lieu of prospectus
in the form laid down in the Fourth Schedule. 3
ABRIDGED PROSPECTUSES
Where the circumstances do not require the strictness of compliance
with the Third Schedule34 of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965, section
40(5)'" reduces the requirements, and allows abridged prospectuses which
need not comply with section 4036 of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965 and
the Third 7 Schedule to that Act. Abridged prospectuses are allowed where
the issue is restricted to existing members or debenture holders of the
company, with or without the right to renounce in favour of other persons.'
APPLICATIONS AND ALLOTMENTS
A company which is inviting the public to subscribe for its shares for
the first time cannot make any allotments until the minimum subscription
has been taken up by the applicants, and the sums payable by them for
the shares have in fact been paid. 9 Section 50(1)40 of the Jamaica Com-
panies Act 1965 provides that no securities shall be alloted in pursuance
of a prospectus issued generally until the beginning of the third day after
that on which the prospectus is first issued, or a later time (if any) as may
be specified in the prospectus. This is intended to give the press time to
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comment on the merits or demerits of the issue, and thus to give the
public an opportunity not only to apply for the securities, but also to
obtain expert advice before doing so. Unfortunately none of the other
territories have such a provision, and therefore investors in the other
territories do not enjoy this safeguard.
CIVIL SANCTIONS
An allottee who was induced to apply for shares or debentures offered
in a prospectus by a misstatement therein may have a claim against the
company, the directors, promoters, persons who have authorised the issue
of the prospectus, experts or against all of them together. Taking the
company first, it is only liable to pay compensation to those who subscribe
for any of the shares or debentures on the faith of the prospectus for the
loss or damage they suffer as a result of any untrue statement in that
prospectus," if it can be shown that the company is a person who author-
ised the issue of the prospectus. Further, if the Company can be shown to
be responsible, the allottee may be able to rescind his contract. 42 The
allottee may perhaps also sue the company on the tort of deceit.
4
The allottee may sue the directors on the tort of deceit, 44 but it must
be proved that they have been fraudulent in misrepresenting facts stated
in the prospectus. If fraud can be established, they would be liable in
damages.45 The allottee may also sue the directors under section 43 (1) (a)
and (b) 46 of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965 for compensation for his
loss. The equivalent section in the English Companies Act was passed after
the unfortunate decision in DERRY v PEEK,47 and under this section the
present legal position4 8 is that the director is prima jacie liable once the
statement is proved to be untrue. The onus then rests on the director to
show that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the statement was
true, and that he did in fact believe in the truth of the statement up to the
time of the allotment of the shares or debentures in question. By shifting
the burden of proof in this way, the legislature has armed the investor with
a potent weapon for redress. Section 4349 may also be used against an
expert who has given his consent to a statement in a prospectus, if the
untrue statement was made by him as an expert.
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Directors and other persons who publish fraudulent or misleading
reports with the intention of inducing the public to take shares can incur
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criminal as well as civil liability. At common law, they could be indicted
and tried for conspiracy. 50 In the Jamaica Companies Act 1965, section
4451 deals with criminal liability. An untrue statement 52 in a prospectus
constitutes prima facie evidence that a criminal offence under this section
has been committed. This section completely reverses the rules of criminal
liability, for under the section the accused is guilty unless he can plead
one or more of the defences admitted by the section 3 to the satisfaction
of the court. Section 36554 of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965 provides
that a person shall be criminally liable if he wilfully makes a false state-
ment in any material particular, knowing it to be false, in any of the
documents listed in the Eleventh Schedule 5 to that Act.
Section 26 of the Jamaica Larceny Law5' provides inter alia that if
a director, manager, or public officer of a company makes an untrue
statement knowing it to be false with the intention to deceive or defraud
any of the persons mentioned in the section, he shall be liable to im-
prisonment for a maximum of seven years.57
IMPROPER USE OF INSIDER INFORMATION"'
There are no enactments prohibiting the improper use of insider in-
formation in the Commonwealth Caribbean. In the United States there are
such enactments.59 In the Commonwealth Caribbean therefore, any curbs
on the improper use of insider information are to be found in the general
law. This is a particular weakness in the measures of investor protection
in the Commonwealth Caribbean. 60
The fundamental principle is that neither directors, nor, a jortiori
any other company officer, owes a fiduciary duty to any individual share-
holder.61 Fiduciary duties are owed to the company. The result of this is
that a director who, by reason of his office, acquired in confidence a
particular piece of information materially affecting the value of the secu-
rities of his company, will incur no liability to the other party if he buys
and sells such securities without disclosing that piece of information. In
the United States both a personal and a corporate action may lie in sim-
ilar circumstances. 62
A fiduciary duty is however, owed to the company by its directors,
and it is submitted that any profits made by them from the use of insider
information in dealings in the company's securities must be disgorged to
the company. This fiduciary duty is very strict, so that in one case where
the directors acting in good faith and intending to act for the benefit of
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the company subscribed for shares in a subsidiary company formed with
a view to expanding the business of their company, and sold these shares
later at a profit, they were accountable to their company for the profit.
63
At common law and in equity, the principles governing fiduciaries
acting in the course of their fiduciary relationship are perfectly clear and
immutable. In the words of Lord Porter64
... the principle that a person occupying a fiduciary relationship
shall not make a profit by reason thereof is of such vital im-
portance that the possible consequence in the present case is in
fact as it is in law an immaterial consideration.
In fact there are two grounds on which directors or other officers in a
fiduciary relationship towards the company have to account. First, the
fiduciary is not allowed to retain any profit made in a situation where
there was any potential conflict between his own interests and those of the
company.65 Secondly, if the fiduciary, directly or indirectly, makes a profit
from the use of the company's money, property, information or advantages,
he has to deliver up this profit to the company.66 Unless, of course, there
is full disclosure to the company and the company allows him to keep it.
Where there is a situation of potential conflict of interest, the fact
that the company could not have availed itself of the opportunity does not
prevent the company from successfully suing to recover the profit made
by the fiduciary. This is true whether the company has not taken the
opportunity because it does not have the money, 67 or because the third
party was not willing to deal with the company 68 or for some other reason.
On the other hand, where there is a legal bar to the company's capacity
to avail itself of the opportunity, then, it is submitted that the company
could not recover the profit in reliance upon these principles. 69 The prin-
ciple to be relied on in such a situation is that of appropriation of cor-
porate property, namely the appropriation of the company's confidential
information, or the misuse of its confidential information. It amounts to
use of the company's property to make a personal profit. The fiduciary
who uses information in such circumstances is a constructive trustee of the
profit and holds it in trust for the company.70 The basis on which a fi-
duciary has to account in these circumstances, is that of use of corporate
property to make a personal profit. 7'
The basis of the principle does not rest on considerations of unjust
enrichment,72 The rationale of the decisions is that a fiduciary will not be
allowed to keep a profit which he makes through the use of his benefi-
ciary's property. The beneficiary might be perfectly unaware of the poten-
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tial of the particular property, in fact he might even be unaware of the
existence of his property right. Nevertheless, if the fiduciary turns it to
a profit, he has to account to the beneficiary for that profit.73 In this re-
spect, the courts in the United States and Canada seem to have relaxed
the rigidity of these principles in particular cases on grounds of policy.
74
Of course, if the information is made public by the company, it is
submitted that such action would constitute a gift of the information to
whosoever wished to receive it. This is a perfectly sound conceptual pos-
sibility. Anyone could then turn this gift to his own profitable account,
without incurring liability to the company.
TAKE-OVER BIDS
75
In Jamaica, where a small minority of shareholders in the offeree
company have not accepted a take-over offer, they are liable to have their
shares compulsorily acquired76 by the offeror company under section
195(1) 77 of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965. The minority have a cor-
responding right to call upon the offeror to buy them out under section
195(2) 78. This right may be exercised only if the offeror is a company,
but not if he is an individual. 79 This is because these provisions were
designed to facilitate mergers of companies and it was thought unreason-
able to give the right of compulsory acquisition to an individual, or to
allow the dissentient minority to have the right to be bought out, exercis-
able against an individual.
The right to be bought out provided by section 195(2) of the
Jamaica Companies Act 1965 may be exercised only if the result of the
offer is that the offeror company holds or can call for the transfer of 90
per cent of the shares concerned.5 0 Similarly, the right of compulsory
acquisition can only be exercised if there has been a 90 per cent approval
of the offer.soa Time limits are imposed upon the power conferred by
section 195(1) of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965, and time limits are
also imposed on the corresponding right conferred by section 195(2) of
the Jamaica Companies Act 1965. Thus, notice of compulsory acquisition
under section 195(1) of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965 may be given
only if there has been a 90 per cent approval within four months after
making the offer, and such notice may be given only during the period of
two months after the end of the four months already mentioned; and
under section 195(2) of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965, the offeror
must inform the minority shareholders of their right to be bought out
within one month after the date of the transfer by virtue of which their
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right arose. The minority holders may also give notice requiring the of-
feror to buy them out within three months of the giving of the offeror's
notice.
The court has power under section 195(1) of the Jamaica Companies
Act 1965 to order or not to order that the shares of a dissentient share-
holder be compulsorily acquired, and under section 195(2) of the Jamaica
Companies Act 1965, the court has power to vary the terms on which the
dissentient shareholders are bought out. The court also has the power to
order that the dissentient shareholder shall have the right to elect where
two or more alternative sets of terms have been included in the offer, and
this right of election remains intact even where one of the alternatives was
for a limited period of time and emanated from a third party."' The court
will act to prevent the misuse of these compulsory acquisition procedures,
and in one case in England the use of the equivalent section in the English
Companies Acts was refused as the offer had not been made by a genuinely
independent company. 2 There are no similar provisions in the Federal
Investor Protection Laws of the United States, and in this respect it may
be said that three territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean 3 are ahead
of the United States. There, the protection of the remaining minority in
a take-over situation is based on the general law; the approach has been
to attempt to establish a fiduciary duty owed by the majority shareholders
to the minority to ensure equality of treatment, or alternatively to. estab-
lish liability in tort.84
POWERS OF THE MINISTER8 5
In Jamaica the Minister S6 has power to appoint an inspector to in-
vestigate the conduct of a company's affairs under sections 15787 and
15811 of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965. Under section 157, an in-
spector may be appointed, but any application for such an appointment
".... shall be supported by such evidence as the Minister may require for
the purpose of showing that the applicants have good reason for requiring
the investigation." '9 Under section 158(a), the Minister must appoint an
inspector upon a special resolution of the company concerned or on order
by the Court to that effect.
REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES9°
In section 39(3)9' of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965, the Registrar
is statutorily empowered to exercise his discretion as to whether or not to
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register a prospectus submitted to him for registration. First, he may
refuse to register a prospectus if he considers that on the face of it, it is
misleading;92 and secondly, he may refuse to register a prospectus if he
considers it necessary or expedient for him to carry out an investigation
in order to ascertain whether the prospectus in question is misleading or
not.9" Where the Registrar refuses to register a prospectus, within fourteen
days, he has to inform the company or any other person who delivered
the prospectus for registration.9" He has to inform them by notice in writ-
ing that in his opinion the prospectus is misleading, or that he considers
it necessary to investigate whether it is misleading, and he has to state in
the notice his reasons for forming this opinion. The Registrar has power
within the section to prescribe a longer period than fourteen days within
which to give the said notice in writing.
Where the Registrar has given notice that he considered it necessary
or expedient to carry out an investigation as to whether the prospectus is
misleading, or not, he then has six weeks to carry out his investigation,
but he has power to prescribe a longer period. Within this six weeks, or
longer period if he has so prescribed, if in the Registrar's opinion the
prospectus is not found to be misleading it will be registered. If in the
Registrar's opinion it is found to be misleading, then he has to give notice
in writing to the company or any other person who delivered the prospec-
tus for registration, that the prospectus is misleading, and the reasons for
this opinion have to be stated in the notice. 94a
Where the Registrar uses the power given by section 39(3) and re-
fuses to register a prospectus, the company or other person who has
delivered the prospectus for registration can apply to the Court for an
order to have the Registrar effect registration.9" The Court may then order
registration or dismiss the application. Jamaica is the only territory in the
Commonwealth Caribbean that has these provisions, and is therefore far
in advance of the other territories.96
On the other hand, in relation to memoranda of association and
articles of association, the Registrar of Companies in Jamaica is not
empowered statutorily to exercise any discretion in accepting or rejecting
these documents when they are delivered to him for registration, 97 although
a certificate granted by him is conclusive evidence that all the statutory
requirements have been complied with." In practice, the Registrar would
not accept blindly any documents delivered to him for registration, and
would not register documents which he noticed did not comply with the
statutory provisions. 99 However, the absence of statutory discretion in this
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respect is a weakness in the registration system, and compares unfavour-
ably with the United States' system where in the several States the power
to refuse registration on the basis of non-compliance with the statutory
requirements is normally conferred by statute. 10
INVESTOR PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT 1933
1. Influence of English Company Law:
Disclosure is the cornerstone of the Federal Securities regulations;
it is the great safeguard that governs conduct of corporate man-
agement in many of their activities; it is the best bulwark against
reckless corporate publicity and irresponsible recommendation and
sale of securities.
This quotation from the Securities and Exchange Commission Report
to Congress in 1963101 shows clearly the underlying philosophy of investor
protection in the United States. It is a philosophy based almost wholly on
the disclosure philosophy of the English Companies Act of 1929 to which
American jurists looked when framing their Federal laws governing in-
vestor protection. In the Federal Securities Act 1933, the government
enacted statutory provisions which ensure that such fair and effective
disclosure be made as will permit informed investment decisions by the
investor himself, or by his advisers. The later statutes, also based essen-
tially upon the doctrine of disclosure as the best form of investor protec-
tion, provide for such matters as the regulation of the market places for
securities, 102 the regulation of those who play an important professional
role in those markets, 10 3 as well as the regulation of certain types of hold-
ing and investment companies. 10 4
2. Registration Procedures:
The Securities Act is concerned essentially with securities offered for
sale to the public, directly or indirectly, by the issuing company or by a
person in a control relationship with the issuer. The objectives of this Act
are to provide investors with material financial and other information
concerning such securities and to prevent misrepresentation, deceit or any
other fraudulent practices in the sale of securities. These objectives are
achieved by requiring, in connection with a public offer which is not
exempt from registration, the filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission of a registration statement by the issuer. 10 5 This statement
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includes a form of prospectus setting out information regarding the issuer,
the security, and the offer which will enable the investor to make an in-
dependent appraisal as to the merits or demerits of the security offered,
and to reach an informed investment decision.
The term "securities" is given a very wide definition.10 6 The defini-
tion embraces the usual forms of security such as stocks, bonds, as well as
investment contracts, certificates of interest or participation in profit-
sharing arrangements and any right to subscribe for any of them. Thus,
the United States Supreme Court has held that schemes for the sale of
small orange groves to investors resident in other states who are unable
and did not intend to manage the groves, combined with contracts for the
care of these groves and the transmission to the investor of the proceeds
less a charge for these services, amounted to securities within the defini-
tion in section 2 of the Act.107
Registration is effected by filing with the Commission, forms specified
in the Schedules of the 1933 Act, and in this respect, there is great simil-
arity to the Commonwealth Caribbean procedures. However, all the Fed-
eral measures of investor protection are administered by a single body, the
Securities and Exchange Commission whereas in the Commonwealth
Caribbean they are administered by different persons such as the Regis-
trar of Companies, 0" and the Minister.10 9
Information such as the property and business carried on by the
issuer, significant features of the security to be offered and its relationship
to the capital structure of the business, the system of management, and
proposed use of the proceeds of the offer must be included in the state-
ment.110 Financial statements certified by independent accountants must
also accompany the statement."' The registration statement then becomes
public immediately upon filing, but sales or contracts for sale of the
securities by the issuer or his underwriters to dealers or investors must
not be entered into before the effective date of the registration statement,
which occurs twenty days after the registration statement, or any later
amendments are filed.' 12 The Commission can, however, provide for an
earlier effective date in accordance with the Act." 3 The basic period here
is longer than under section 504 of the Jamaica Companies Act 1965.
However, the Commission has the power to grant a shorter period which
gives greater flexibility to the United States system.
There are exemptions from registration for certain types of securities
or transactions such as private offerings to a limited group of persons who
either have access to any relevant information or can look after them-
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selves; 1 1 certain offers which are limited to the residents of a particular
state by an issuer organised and doing business in that state;116 municipal,
state and federal issues, and other U.S. government securities, 117 as well
as charitable organisations" 5 and co-operatives.1- 9
The 1933 Act also provides that the Commission may institute ad-
ministrative proceedings to refuse or to suspend effectiveness of the
registration statement if it appears to be materially incomplete
. 
or inac-
curate. 20 Thus, every registration statement is examined before and after
registration. Administrative proceedings are in fact rare, but the power
exists nevertheless, and is available for use if and when the occasion arises.
Jamaica alone has procedures of similar quality. Although the registration
procedures may not insure investors as to the accuracy of the information
contained in the registration statement, the whole process of examination
and amendment if necessary, is similar to the procedures of the Registrar
of Companies in Jamaica towards prospectuses, and introduces a substan-
tial element of reliability. The other territories ought to adopt these pro-
cedures as a matter of urgency.
The statutory scheme of registration under the Federal Securities Act,
1933, places -the issuer virtually in the position of an insurer of the
accuracy and adequacy of the registration statement, and subjects the
others, particularly the directors, underwriters, certifying accountants, and
other experts, to the very strict burden of proof that they have acted care-
fully and diligently.' 2 ' The standard is that "required of a prudent man
in the management of his own property."' 122 It is submitted the shifting of
the burden of proof in the Companies Act of the Commonwealth Carib-
bean as already done2 3 closely approximates this test, and in this, respect
the investor protection measures are of similar effectiveness. All those
involved in the preparation and the filing of the registration statement are
subject to penalties and are liable for false statements or half-truths, or the
omission of required information. i2 4 In a suit for damages in respect of
any material misstatement in or omission from the registration statement
and prospectus, the plaintiff need not establish reliance or causation in
order to succeed, it is .enough that he has been misled. This goes somewhat
further than the Commonwealth Caribbean position because there induce-
ment has to be established. The plaintiff has to establish that he relied on
the statement, although the statement need not be the only inducement.
125
Once reliance is established, the fact that the statement is misleading is
prima facie evidence of liability. 126 As far as the Commission is con-
cerned, it has no authority to control the nature or quality of a security
to the extent of amounting to approval of the issue.' 27 In fact, it is a
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criminal offence to represent that the Commission has found the regis-
tration statement true and accurate. 12 Section 24 of the Act imposes
criminal penalties for wilful violation of any of its provisions.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 1934
This Act provides for the regulation of exchanges of securities by
registration of the Stock Exchanges with the Securities and Exchange
Commission,12 9 and for the registration of all broker-dealers, except those
who have exclusively intrastate dealings, those whose business is trans-
acted entirely on a national securities exchange and those whose entire
business is in exempted securities, commercial paper, bankers' acceptances
or commercial bills."0 The Commission also supervises their rules and
practices. Over-the-counter broker-dealers are also required to register with
the Commission.1 ' The disclosure principle is extended to the matters
dealt with in this Act so that issuers to whom the Act applies are required
to register 132 listed or equity securities and to file"' annual and periodic
reports with the Commission, as well as with the Stock Exchanges in which
they are listed. The Act applies to all corporations whose securities are
listed on a national stock exchange, but the Securities Act Amendments
in 196t'3 4 extended the provisions of the Act to all corporations engaged
in, or whose securities are traded in interstate or foreign commerce, with
assets in excess of $1 million, and whose equity securities are held by at
least 500 persons.13"
1. Stock Exchange Securities
Issuers who wish to list their securities for trading on a registered
stock exchange must first come to an agreement with that particular stock
exchange, and are required under the 1934 Act, to file an application for
registration with the Commission and the exchange." 6 The application for
registration must contain information which is essentially similar to that
required in a registration statement under the Federal Securities Act 1933.
In fact, where an application for listing coincides with a public offer, the
same documents are usually sufficient for both purposes. Trading in the
securities may not begin until the application becomes effective, which
occurs thirty days after the Commission receives from the stock exchange
certification that the security has been approved for listing and registra-
tion. A period shorter than thirty days may be allowed by the Commission,
for it has power to make such a determination. The issuer is also under
an obligation to file with both the Commission and the stock exchange,
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
annual, periodic and current reports necessary to keep the information
originally filed up to date, as well as giving notice of any significant
changes in the business operations.'37
The forms for registration under the 1934 Act, as well as those under
the 1933 Act are administered by the same staff. This gives the Commis-
sion an opportunity for comparison which is invaluable in the discovery
of any inaccuracies or dishonesty. The Commission has power to suspend
the effective date of any security, or to withdraw registration of a security
if it is discovered that the issuer has failed to comply with any provision
of the law or any rule or regulation made pursuant to the Acts. The
Commission may, if the public interest requires such action, suspend trad-
ing in any registered security for a period of ten days; or if the President
of the United States so approves, the Commission may suspend all trading
on any national securities exchange for a period of ninety days. There are
also penalties for filing false statements with the Commission and the
stock exchange, and investors have rights of recovery if they suffer damage
in the purchase and sale of listed securities in reliance on the false
information.1" 8
2. Takeover Bids and Control of Proxy Solicitation
The 1934 Act controls proxy solicitation under section 14, which
lays down that there shall be no solicitation " . . . in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe." The Commission
makes such rules and regulations as are considered necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest and for the protection of investors. Thus
comprehensive regulations governing the solicitation of security-holders
in relation to the election of directors or for the approval of other cor-
porate action have been adopted. The Proxy Statement must contain the
information required by Schedule 14A. If it is a management proxy for
a meeting where directors are to be elected, the proxy must be accom-
panied by a Report showing the financial position over the last two
years, and all other material facts concerning the proposals upon which
such holders are required to vote; the security holders must be afforded
an opportunity to vote 'yes' or 'no' upon each proposal.
These requirements for the full disclosures of all relevant information
are based on the disclosure philosophy" 9 underlying all these enactments,
and are a very effective means of compelling those who stand to benefit
from the proposals to give an account of their stewardship in the manage-
ment of the company. The form of the proxy is set out in detail in Rule
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14a-4 of the Commission, and preliminary and definitive copies of the
proxy statement and Reports must be filed with the Commission before
the material is sent out to the shareholders. 140
Rule 14a-8 requires the circulation of security holders' proposals by
the management if the proposal is "a proper subject for shareholder
action."1 41 Under Rule 14a-7 shareholders may demand certain informa-
tion, as for example, the number of security holders and the cost of
mailing a communication to them. The prohibition of false or misleading
information is governed by Rule 14a-9.1 42 If the rules are not complied
with, the Commission may obtain an injunction to prevent the use of the
mails by the wrongdoers, 14 and if the violation is wilful, the Commission
can initiate a criminal prosecution against those responsible. In addition
to the sanctions which the Commission has, it has become established
that the security holders themselves have civil remedies against those in
breach of the Rules, so that damages can be awarded, if appropriate.'"
Where a contest for control of, or representation on the board of
directors of a corporation is involved, the Rules require full disclosure
of the names and the interests of all those who are participating in the
proxy contest. 14 The Rules are very wide, and make provision for effec-
tive communication among the security-holders themselves. This is done
by compelling the management to furnish reasonably current lists of
security-holders, 1 " or to mail the security-holder's proxy material for
him at his expense.1 47
The rules require that proposed material which will be used for
proxy-soliciting must be filed with the Commission prior to use,148 so that
detailed examination can take place in order to ensure that the disclosure
provisions have been complied with. Although there is no provision for
administrative proceedings to test the accuracy or propriety of suspicious
documents or practices, all these documents are public and are considered
to be communications subject to the fraud provisions of the proxy regu-
lations.1 49 The Commission is also empowered to apply to the courts to
prohibit illegal or improper acts, and to compel compliance with the
statutes. 5° These provisions are designed to guard against the disenfran-
chisement of security holders by the use of improper practices. Further,
if the Commission refuses to act in order to prevent malpractices from
occurring, any aggrieved person may apply to the courts for an appro-
priate equitable remedy.15! He must show that the statement or omission
claimed to be misleading amounted to a statement that would influence
the stockholders' vote, 152 and in order for civil liability to result from the
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violation, it must be shown that the violation of the statute resulted in the
damage claimed. 53 It is a criminal offence to wilfully violate any of the
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act 1934.154 Similar provisions do
not exist in any Commonwealth Caribbean territory.
3. Improper Use of Inside Information'5 5
One of the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act 1934
was to outlaw the use of inside information by corporate officers and
principal holders for their own financial advantage to the detriment of
uninformed public security holders.156
Section 10 of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 of the Commission's Rules
require an insider, that is, any officer or director of the company, who
uses material1' 7 undisclosed corporate information for personal gain by
trading in the corporations' securities, to surrender his profit.15 Not only
must the insider himself surrender his profit, but anyone to whom the
information was given by the insider who used the information for his
gain can also be made to surrender his profits. 59 These provisions go
much further than the position in the Commonwealth Caribbean which is
governed entirely by the rules of common law and equity. First, the
principle in Commonwealth Caribbean law that a director owes no fidu-
ciary duty to individual shareholders laid down in the decision in PER-
CIVAL v WRIGHT 60 has no application in United States Federal
Securities law. Further, in the United States, the managing director, the
solicitor of the two companies and Miss Geering in REGAL (HASTINGS)
v GULLIVER' 6' would have had to surrender the profits which they
made in that transaction. This would be so because, as mentioned earlier,
the surrender provisions relate to the insider as well as anyone to whom
he gives the information and who makes use of that information and
makes a gain.' 6 2 Rule lob-5163 applies to any person and any security, it
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
die use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
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(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule 10b-5 has a number of advantages over the common law, for
it is free of some of the technicalities of common law fraud. Substantively
it is free from the need to prove reliance, deliberate or reckless falsehood,
or a loss; and procedurally, the 1934 Act 6 4. in Section 27 gives extra-
territorial service of process. Actions may be brought in any district
where the act or transaction occurred, or where the defendant is found,
or where the defendant transacts business. The Federal Courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the 1934 Act or the Rules and
Regulations of the Commission.
The other section which is directed at corporate insiders is Section 16
of the 1934 Act which is aimed at ". . preventing the unfair use of
information . . . obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer
by reason of his relationship to the insider . . .- 165 Each officer and
director of a company whose equity securities are listed on an exchange
and each person owning beneficially more than 10% of such securities,
must file initial and monthly reports with the Commission and the ex.
change, showing his holdings of each of the company's equity securities
and any changes in those holdings.16" In addition, section 16(b) provides
that profits obtained by persons mentioned in that section from purchases
and sales, or sales and purchases, of such securities within any six-month
period may be recovered by the company, or by any security holder on
behalf of the company. 1 ' Section 16(b) thus gives a corporate cause of
action, and the right to recovery must be asserted in an appropriate
court.' 1 A wrongdoer who infringes this section may therefore expose
himself to double liability, for first there is the corporate action which may
be brought under section 16(b), and secondly, the buying169 or selling
shareholder may obtain personal recovery for failure of the insider to
make full disclosure under Rule 10b-5. There are no similar provisions in
any Commonwealth Caribbean territory.
4. Regulation o1 Brokers and Dealers
The 1934 Act requires registration of brokers and dealers who con-
duct over-the-counter securities business in interstate commerce. 170
National securities exchanges are required to register with the Commis-
sion, 171 associations of brokers and dealers may register if they wish to do
so, but are not required to register. 172 Registered brokers and dealers
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must conform their business practices to the standards prescribed in the
1931 Act, as well as the Rules made by the Commission for the protection
of investors. 73 If the Commission discovers that a broker or dealer has
not complied with the provisions of the Securities Act 1933 or the Ex-
change Control Act of 1934, if, for example, he has filed false statements or
if he has been convicted of a wrong in relation to the purchase or sale of a
security, the Commission may refuse to register the wrongdoer if he
has not yet been registered, 74 or it may revoke his registration if he has
been registered. 17
Stock exchanges must also be registered with the Commission, unless
they are exempted from registration. 171 Before registration is granted to
a stock exchange, it must agree to comply with the provisions of the
Statutes and the Rules made by the Commission, also it must show that
it is capable of complying with those provisions and that it is able to
enforce compliance with the provisions as far as its members are con-
cerned.177 Further, it must be shown that the rules of the stock exchange
itself are just and adequate to ensure fair dealing and to properly protect
investors.17s The Commission has power to alter or supplement the rules
of the stock exchanges if it considers such alterations necessary to give
effect to the statutory obligations." 9 The Commission has also the au-
thority to suspend the registration of a national securities stock exchange
for a period of up to twelve months if it is found that the exchange has
infringed the statutory provisions or the Rules of the Commission; or if
it is found that the stock exchange has failed to enforce as far as it
could, the compliance with the above provisions, of any of its members,
or an issuer of a security on that exchange. Notice'8 0 has to be given to
the offending stock exchange, and an opportunity for it to be heard.''
5. Sectrities and Exchange Commission
The Securities and Exchange Commission was set up under section
4 of the Securities Exchange Act 1934. The Commission has the power
to make rules, regulations and forms, to exercise administrative controls,
and to take certain enforcement action. The Commission is required to
report to Congress annually. Section 4 of the 1934 Act sets the Commission
up as an independent agency of the Federal Government. It is composed
of five Commissioners appointed by the President, only three of whom
may be from any one political party. The Commissioners hold office for
five years at a time and retire in rotation. The Commission has a salaried
lull-time staff organized into four divisions, namely Corporate Finance,
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Trading and Exchanges, Corporation Regulation, and Administration and
Management. The staff of the Commission is composed of lawyers, ac-
countants, engineers, security analysts, examiners, and administrative
employees in order to give as broad a base as possible to its operation.
The Commission is vested with authority to investigate complaints
and any other indications that the law of investor protection is being
violated. This authority is conferred by each of the statutes administered
by the Commission in relation to matters dealt with in that particular
statute.18 2 In the execution of these powers, the Commission can conduct
examinations of witnesses under oath, it can issue subpoenas ordering
witnesses to attend and give evidence or demanding the production of
documents' 3 and the Commission is entitled to apply to the proper
United States District Court in order to enforce compliance with the
subpoenas which it issues.1 8 4 It can also accept sworn statements relating
to any matters under investigation.'8 5
Whenever it appears to the Commission that anyone has committed
or is about to commit an offence in relation to any of the Federal Securities
Acts, the Commission may in its own name, bring an action in the
United States District Court to penalise the wrongdoer if he has already
committed the offence,18 6 or to restrain him from committing the offence
if he has not yet done so; and if the Commission has enough evidence,
the court is authorized to issue a permanent or temporary injunction or
restraining order. 187 The Commission also has the power to apply for, and
the court may grant, if it is a proper case where it should be granted, a
mandatory injunction compelling the party to whom it is directed to comply
with statutory requirements and appropriate rules or orders of the Com-
mission made under the statutes."'8 In order to give effect to any injunc-
tion or other order of the court, a receiver may be appointed to preserve
assets or to act as may be necessary or appropriate in the circumstances.' 8 9
All of the statutes impose criminal penalties for any wilful violation
of the statutory provisions, or the Commission's Rules made pursuant to
the said statutes.190 The Commission may also lay such evidence as is
available concerning any act or practice before the Attorney-General, who
may, in the exercise of his discretion, institute criminal proceedings
against the wrongdoer. 191
Under each of the statutes, the Commission has power, and in some
instances is under an obligation, to adopt rules and regulations which are
considered necessary for the implementation of the statutory requirements
and provisions.192 These rules and regulations may involve the classifica-
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tion of issues, of the issuers or other persons and transactions, and the
power to define or clarify terms used in the Act. The form and presenta-
tiodi of financial and other information may also be prescribed under the
rules and regulations of the Commission.
The statutes provide that no penalties lie against anyone who places
bonafide reliance on any of the rules or other measures of the Commission,
even if the rules on which reliance was placed, are later rescinded or
found to be invalid.193 This statutory immunity in the case of bona fide
reliance on the rules is necessary for the fair, just and proper operation
of these rules.
The rules, regulations and procedures of the Commission are con-
tinually under review, and every effort is made to keep them abreast of
current developments in the changing patterns of securities flotation. In
order to ensure that changes should be realistic and functional, any pro-
posed new rules and proposals for important amendments of the rules are
usually published before enactment in order to obtain the comments,
views and suggestions of those affected and of the public in general.
Conferences may be held where appropriate, and if the situation requires
it, public hearings may be held.' 9 4
The Federal Securities Statutes contain specific civil liability provi-
sions which give investors, rights of recovery against those who infringe
the statutory provisions) 9 5. Strictly, these rights are to be pursued in the
Federal Courts. 196 but additionally, private actions under all the statutes
except the Securities Exchange Act 1934 may be asserted in the state
courts as well. 19 7 Any contracts made in violation of these investor pro-
tection laws are void, 198 and any condition, stipulation, or provision bind-
ing. anyone to waive compliance with any provision of the Acts or any
rule of the Commission is similarly void.199
In addition to the remedies laid down in the Acts, the courts have
shown an icreasing readiness to imply civil remedies as well as the
statutory ones when breaches of the statutory provisions occur.2 00 This
recent development of implied liability is linked to the common law tort
doctrine that a private right of action arises where there is a violation of
a statutory provision of an anti-fraud nature, the disregard of the com-
mand of the statute is a wrongful act and a tort. The private right arises
as a result of the moral turpitude associated with fraudulent activity.20'
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CONCLUSION
The Commonwealth Caribbean and the United States have both
relied upon the same philosophy in relation to the protection of investors.
That philosophy is disclosure. It is the philosophy first adopted in
England. 2 2 However, the implementation of this philosophy has not
reached the same stage of development in the Commonwealth Caribbean
and the United States.
In the Commonwealth Caribbean, Jamaica has by far the most
comprehensive set of provisions for investor protection. Jamaica is also
the only territory that has a stock exchange. This is primarily because
Jamaica is the most industrialised of the territories and is the most de-
veloped commercially. The protective measures in Jamaica are more
satisfactory in relation to the issue of securities, but less so in relation
to dealings in securities once they have been issued. Any protection after
issue is afforded by the general law and reliance would have to be placed
on actions based on fraud, for example, with all its attendant difficulties.
The territories of Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, St. Lucia and
Trinidad and Tobago have a number of provisions regulating the issue of
securities, but dealings in securities once they are issued are also left to
the general law. Protective measures in the other territories are feeble.
This is deliberate in those territories that have decided to assume the role
of the tax haven in order to attract commercial activity where otherwise
there would probably be none. In others, the absence of comprehensive
protective measures seems to be a reflection of the low level of commercial
activity.
The United States on the other hand have established a comprehen-
sive and complete statutory body of rules for the protection of investors;
there is also some voluntary regulation. 2 3 Of course the industrial and
commercial development of the United States is far in advance of all the
Commonwealth Caribbean territories. The evolution of the United States
system has been influenced by a number of factors. First, in 1933 when
it was realized that the security laws needed strengthening there was no
nation-wide machinery, and there was no single stock exchange with
nation-wide power similar to that which, for example, the London Stock
Exchange had in the United Kingdom. Further, the majority of new se-
curities in the United States are not listed, and the size of the United
States and the existence of some fifty different legal units leading in-
evitably to conflict of laws problems, meant that strong central control was
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necessary. Thus the Securities and Exchange Commission was established
to exercise centralised control.
The adoption of a centralised system based on the United States
model, however, go far beyond what is necessary for any single territory
in the Commonwealth Caribbean. In the wider context of CARICOM,
2 0 4
however this might well be feasible and desirable. This much is certain,
in the light of the rapid industrial and commercial development taking
place in the Commonwealth Caribbean, and in the interests of promoting
and sustaining this development, the investor protection measures in
almost all the territories are desperately in need of improvement.2 5
NOTES
1Stated in the conclusion of the United Kingdom Department of Trade &
Industry White Paper on "Company Law Reform" July 1973 Cmnd. 5391 para 65.
2Abbreviations for the territories will be used throughout. The territories re-
ferred to and the abbreviations used are as follows; the independent territories of:
The Bahamas (Bah.), Barbados (Bds.), Grenada (Gren.), Guyana (Guy.), Jamaica
(Jam.), Trinidad & Tobago (TT); the Associated States of: Antigua (Ant.),
Dominica (Dom.), St. Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla (KNA), St. Lucia (St.L.), St. Vincent
(St.V.); and the Colonies of: Belize (Blz.), Bermuda (Berm.), the Cayman Islands
(Cay.), the Virgin Islands (Virgs.), and Montserrat (Mont).
3Ant. Berm., Cay., Dom., Mont., KNA, St.V., Virgs.
4 Bah., Bds., Blz., Gren., Guy., SL.L.
5TT.
'Jam.
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1958; Berm. Vol. iv Title 17 Items 5-11, and 14 R/E 1971; Cay. Cap.22 R/E 1963;
Dom. Cap.318 R/E 1961; Gren. Cap.47 R/E 1934; Guy. Cap.328 R/E 1953; Jam.
Law 7/65; Mont. Cap.308 R/E 1962; KNA Cap.335 RiE 1961; St.L. Title iv Cap.
244 R/E 1957; St.V. Title xxiii Cap.6 R/E 1966; TT Cap.31 R/E 1950; Virgs.
Cap.243 R/E 1961.
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IOUnited States Constitution Art. 1, s.8.C1.2,7.
iAnt. s.76; Bds. ss.79, 80; Blz. ss.80, 81; Dom. s.76; Gren. ss.81, 82; Guy.
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12Bds. s,2(1); Blz. s.2(1); Gren. s.2; Guy. s.247(1); Jam. s.2(1); KNA
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14GOVERNMENT STOCKS & OTHER SECURITIES INVESMENT CO. LTD.
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aRefers to note 21 in text.
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27Bds. s.119(2); Blz. s.120(2); Gren. s.121(2); Guy. s.117(2); Jam. s.31(1);
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36Supra, note 13.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
37Snpra, note 21.
38Supra, note 35.
39Bds. s.84(l); Blz. s.85(1); Gren. s.86(1); Guy. s.83(1); Jam. s.47(1) ; St.L.
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St.L. Art.145(l)(d); TT s.39(l)(d). The subsection in the Guyana Act says
"everyone" rather than "every person." All the Acts in the other territories use the
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for breach of their duties. Unfortunately for the allottee, as a result of the decision
in HOULDSWORTH v CITY OF GLASGOW BANK (1880) 5 App.Cas.317, the
allottee cannot recover damages from the company unless he also gets rescission,
he cannot retain the shares and also sue the company on the tort of deceit. In
England an action under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 may also lie, but similar
legislation has not yet been enacted in any of the Commonwealth Caribbean terri-
tories.
44DERRY v PEEK (1889) 14 App.Cas.337. Fraud is however notoriously diffi.
cult to prove at common law.
45AKERHIELM v DE MARE (1959) A.C. 789.
46Bds. s.83(1); Blz. s.84(1); Gren. s.85(1); Guy. s.82(1); St.L. Art.145(1)(a),
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47(1899) 14 App. Cas.337.
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4 9Supra, note 41.
5oSCOTT v BROWN, DOERING, McNAB & CO. (1892) 2 Q.B.724.
5tThis section appears only in the Jamaica Companies Act. It first appeared in
the English Companies Act 1948.
52A statement is deemed to be untrue if it is misleading in the form and context
in which it is included, s.46(a) Jam. Act 1965. This subsection endorses the
reasoning adopted in the decisions of: R v KYLSANT (1932) 1 K.B. 442; R v
BISHIRGIAN (1936) 1 All.E.R.586.
531n the Commonwealth Caribbean, Jamaica alone has adopted this enlightened
approach.
54Bds. s.7(b) Perjury Act 1963 which repeals and reenacts s.229 Bds. Companies
Act 1910; Blz. s.254; Gren. s.2 31 ; Guy. s.249; TT s.313.
55Bds. fourth; Blz. fourth; Gren. fifth; TT tenth.
56Bds. s.68 Larceny Act 1868; Blz. Art.171 Criminal Code Cap.21 Title xii
Laws of British Honduras R/E 1958 Vol.1; Gren. Art.285 Criminal Code Cap.76
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Laws of Gren. TI/E 1958 Vol.1; Guy. s.205 Cap.10 Criminal Law (Offences) Laws
of Guy. R/E 1953 Vol.1; Jam. s.26 Larceny Law Cap.212 Laws of Jam. R/E 1953
Vol.v.
57R v KYLSANT (1932) 1 K.B.442; R v BIRSHIRGIAN (1936) 154 L.T. 499.
581nsider information in this context may be defined as information which (1)
is important in relation to the true value of the particular securities being dealt in,
and (2) is of a secret and confidential nature. It is submitted that the nature of
the information is the governing factor rather than the circumstances in which it
was obtained, or the status of the person who has the information. So that if
someone places a microphone in the room where a meeting of the board of directors
is taking place and obtains information about plans for a take-over bid or about a
new important discovery of minerals or an impending disaster, such information is
insider information. Similarly, if someone overheard the meeting and acquired the
information in that way. An insider would therefore be a person employed by the
company who owes fiduciary duties to the company, or who holds an office of trust
or confidentiality.
5t Sec. 10, 16, Securities Exchange Act 1934, and particularly Rule 10b-5 of the
S.E.C.
60The same applies to England. See: Report of the Company Law Committee
Cmnd.1749 paras.8-91 and 99; Dept. of Trade and Industry White Paper on Com-
pany Law Reform Cmnd.5391 paras.15-20; JUSTICE Report on "Insider Trading"
London 1972 paras.20-26; Aaron Yoran: "Insider Trading in Israel and England"
Jerusalem 1972. For some Canadian proposals see: "Proposals for a New Business
Corporations Law for Canada" Vol. 1 Ottawa 1971 pt. 10.00; also Securities Act
1966 (Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1970 c.4 20) s.113, s.109, s.(1) para.2 (repealed
and substituted 1971, Vol. 2, c.31, s.l(1); see also; GREEN v CHARTER-HOUSE
GROUP CANADA LTD. (1973) 2 OR.677.
61PERCIVAL v WRIGHT (1902) 2 Ch. 421. Nor will a fiduciary duty be owed
to anyone from whom a director or other officer buys shares, or to whom, a director
or other company officer sells shares when that person is not a shareholder at the
time of the sale.
62Sec. 10, 16 Securities Exchange Act 1934 S.E.C. v TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
CO., 5 CCH. FED. SEC. L.R. 9225 (1968).
63REGAL (HASTINGS) v GULLIVER (1942) 1 ALLE.R. 378.
641bid. p.394.
65ABERDEEN RY. v BLAIKIE (1854) 1 Maco. H.L.461 (H.L.Sc.) per Ld.
Cranworth L.C.: ". . . if is a rule of universal application that no one, having such
duties to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or
can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the
interests of those whom he is bound to protect."
Ld. Russel of Killowen in REGAL (HASTINGS) v GULLIVER (1942) 1 All.
E.R. 378, 386. "The liability arises from the mere fact of a profit having in the
stated circumstances been made. The profiteer, however honest and well-intentioned,
cannot escape the risk of being called upon to account."
Ibid. per Viscount Sankey at p.381. "In my view, the respondents were in a
fiduciary position and their liability to account does not depend upon proof of
mala fides. The general rule of equity is that no one who has duties of a fiduciary
nature to perform is allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or can have
a personal interest conflicting with the interests of those whom he is bound to
protect."
Guth v Loft, Inc. 23 Del. Ch.255 at 270, 5 A. 2d 503, at 510 (1939). "The rule,
inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the narrow ground
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of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confidence, but
upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that for the purpose of removing
all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the
confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation."
James L.J. PARKER v MOKENNA (1874) L.R. 10 Ch. 96, 124 "... that
rule is an inflexible rule, and must be applied inexorably by this court, which is
not entitled, in any judgment to receive evidence or suggestion or argument as to
whether the principal did or did not suffer any injury in fact by reason of the
dealings of the agent; for the safety of mankind requires that no agent shall be
able to put his principal to the danger of such an injury as that."
66BOSTON DEEP SEA FISHING & ICE CO. v ANSELL (1888) 39 Ch.D.339;
COOK v DEEKS (1916) A.C. 554; REGAL (HASTINGS) v GULLIVER (1942)
1 AII.E.R.378. BOARDMAN v PHIPPS (1967) 2 A.C. 46.
67REGAL (HASTINGS) v GULLIVER (1942) 1 ALL.E.R. 378.
6SINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS v COOLEY (1972) 2
ALL.E.R.162.
69The basis of decisions like DIAMOND v OREAMUNDO 24 NY 2d.494 (1969)
in the United States is really that of placing, or allowing oneself to be placed, or
being in a situation of potential conflict of duty and interest. This is because in the
U.S.A. a company can buy its own shares. In the Commonwealth Caribbean on the
other hand, it is illegal for a company to buy its own shares: TREVOR v WHIT-
WORTH (1887) 12 App.Cas.409. No question of conflict of duty and interest arises
therefore when it is a question of a purchase of the particular company's own
shares in the territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean, for the company is legally
barred from making such a purchase.
70BROPHY v CITIES SERVICE CO. 70 A2d. 5 (1949).
7 11t is submitted that a similar argument is the real basis of the decision in:
BOSTON DEEP SEA FISHING & ICE CO. v ANSELL (1888) 39 Ch.D.339. The
actual post of director is corporate property, and if turned to personal profit, that
profit has to be disgorged to the company on the basis of the principles governing
the obligation on fiduciaries to surrender secret profits.
72 0ne learned writer has argued cogently that it should. See: Gareth Jones
(1968) 84 L.Q.R.472.
73Supra, note 66.
741n this modem day and country when it is accepted as commonplace that
substantially all business and commercial undertakings, regardless of size or im-
portance are carried on through the corporate vehicle with the attendant complexi-
ties involved . . . I do not consider it enlightened to extend the application of these
principles beyond their present limits. That the principles and the strict rules
applicable to trustees upon which they are based are salutary cannot be disputed,
but care should be taken to interpret them in the light of modern practice and
way of life." per BULL J.A. PESO SILVER MINES LTD. v CROPPER (1966)
56 D.L.R. (2d.) 117, 154; affirmed (1966) 58 D.L.R. (2d.) 1; CRITTENDEN &
COWLER CO. v COWLER, 72 N.Y.S. 701, which runs perfectly counter to KEECH
v SANFORD (1726) Sel. Cas.Ch.61. There is some support for this approach in an
earlier case. See: KAY J. RE FAURE ELECTRIC ACCUMULATOR CO. (1888)
40 Ch.D. 141 at p.151. ". . . it is quite obvious that to apply to directors the strict
rules of the Court of Chancery with respect to ordinary trustees might fetter their
action to an extent which would be exceedingly disadvantageous to the companies
they represent."
75The Companies Acts in the Commonwealth Caribbean except for Jam., TT,
and St.L. have no provisions governing take-over bids.
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761n this take-over situation, the directors of an offeree company owe a duty
to their shareholders which includes the duty to be honest and not to mislead. The
minority shareholders in the offeree company can complain if they are wrongfully
subjected to the power of compulsory purchase by the offeror company under these
compulsory purchase provisions, as a result of a breach of duty on the part of the
board of directors of the offeree company. See: GETHING v KILNER (1972) 1
ALL.E.R. 1166 on the equivalent provisions in England.
77St.L. Art.167C(1); TT s.153(1). The courts in England seem to have ac-
cepted that the existence of the approval of so large a majority as the holders of
nine tenths in value of the shares in question is at least prima facie evidence that
the scheme or contract is fair. See: HOARE & CO., IN RE (1934) 150 L.T. 374;
EVERTITE LOCKNUTS (1954) Ch.220: PRESS CAPS (1949) Ch. 434.
78St.L.Art.167C(2). In England this protective measure was introduced for the
first time in the Companies Act 1948, and is designed to protect shareholders who
might be left out of such a scheme or contract, and might consider themselves
trapped. They may wish to get out of the company since the new majority share-
holders will be almost certain to bring in new management, and to run the company
as they see fit. Unfortunately only Jam. and St.L. have this provision. TFT has given
the offeror company the right to buy out the minority but have not given the
minority the corresponding right to have the majority buy them out. It is submitted
that the weakness ol not having these measures is clear; they prevent internal strife,
and the other territories would do well to follow the lead of Jam. and St.L.
79Ibid.
SORE SIMO SECURITIES TRUST LTD. (1971) 3 ALL.E.R.999 on the equiva-
lent provisions in the English Companies Acts.
saabid.
SIRE CARLTON HOLDINGS LTD. (1971) 2 ALL.E.R.1082; an English de-
cision on the equivalent provision in the English Companies Acts. See: J.B.L. Apr.
1971, p.1 3 8 .
82RE BUGLE PRESS LTD. (1961) CK270.
S3Jam., St.L., TT.
S4PERLMAN v FELDMAN 219 F. 2d 173 (1955) also Hill, Sale of Controlling
Shares 70 Har. L.R. 986, 1019.
SSIn Ant. The Administrator; Bds. Governor-in-Executive Committee; Blz. The
Court; Berm. The Member; Cay. The Court; Dom. The Administrator; Gren. The
Governor-in-Council; Guy. The Governor-in-Council; Jam. The Minister; Mont. The
Admriistrator; KNA. The Administrator; St.V. The Governor; TT. The Governor-
in-Council; Virgs. The Administrator.
S6The Minister for Trade, Industry & Commerce.
87Ant. s.95; Bds. s.107; Blz. s.108; Berm. Item 5 s.42; Cay. s.61; Dom. s.95;
Gren. s.109; Guy. s.106; Mont. s.95; KNA. s.96; St.V. s.50; 'IT. s.13 3 ; Virgs. s.95.
S8In the territories other than Jam. the company itself appoints the inspectors
by special resolution. See: Ant. s.99; Bd. s.108(1); Blz. s.109(1); Cay. s.64; Dom.
s.99 ; Gren. s.110(1); Guy. s.107(1); Mont. s.99; KNA. s.100; St.V. s.54(1); TT.
s.135(1) ; Virgs. s.99.
89 See: PERGAMON PRESS LTD. (1970) 2 ALL.E.R.449; affirmed (1970) 3
ALL.E.R.535. This case deals with the principles and procedures to be followed in
relation to the equivalent provisions in the English Companies Acts.
90Only Berm. Item 14 s.2(1), Cay. s.3(1), and Jam. s.333 have a separate
Registrar of Companies. In the other territories the Registrar General also serves as
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the Registrar of Companies: Ant. s.207(a); Bab. s.14(l); Bds. s.214(l); Biz.
s.219(1); Dom. s.207(a); Gren. s.218(1); Guy. s.219; Mont. s.207(a); KNA.
s.208(a); St.V. s.138; TT. s.285; Virgs. s.207(a); Dr. Robert R. Pennington in his
"REPORT ON THE REVISION OF COMPANY LAW IN TRINIDAD AND
TOBAGO" May 1967 at p.2 criticised the present position in 'FT. and his criticisms
were echoed by Mr. Justice J. Braithwaite in "COMPANY LAW-SOME SUG-
GESTIONS FOR REFORM" a paper delivered at the First Law Conference of
Trinidad and Tobago 23-27 July, 1973. Dr. Pennington urged:
... the following changes are essential:
(i) The appointment of a Registrar of Companies who is independent of
the Registrar General so that his work is in no way regarded as merely
a branch of the general duties of the Registration office;
(i) The appointment of a Registrar of Companies who is professonally quali-
fied as a barrister or solicitor;
(iii) The establishment of a sufficient and competent staff to assist the Regis-
trar of Companies: I would suggest at least one barrister or solicitor
and one accountant, with a statistician if funds available make this a
possibility; a suitable number of typing and clerical assistants would also
be required.
It is submitted that the implementation of these reforms would go a long way
towards eradicating any delays in the registration department and in enforcing the
obligations on companies to file annual returns and other documents, thus ensuring
investor protection.
91No other territory in the Commonwealth Caribbean has similar provisions.





96ndeed Jamaica is also in advance of England, for the Report of the Company
Law Committee in England Cmnd. 1749 recommended that ". . . the Registrar of
Companies should be expressly empowered to refuse to accept any documents
delivered to him for registration if it appears to him to be manifestly unlawful or
ineffective; there should be a right of appeal to the Court against the Registrar's
decision but subject to such appeal his decision should be final." See: para.495(k)
of the Report. This recommendation has so far not been acted upon by the English
Legislature.
97Ant. s.42; Bab. s.14; Bds. ss.17, 18; Biz. s.15; Berm. Item 14 s.13; Cay. s.25;
Dom. s.42; Gren. s.17; Guy. s.15(3); Jam. s.14; Mont. s.42 ; KNA. s.43; St.L. Art.
81(1) ; St.V. s.15(1); TT. s.14; Virgs. s.42. Yet the Registrar has discretion in rela-
tion to registering a company with a particular name, his refusal to register being
subject to examination to the Court on application for mandamus ordering him to
register the company by the particular name. See: Ant. s.12; Bab. s.18; Bds. s.10;
Blz.:s.9; Berm. Item 14 s.8; Cay. s.29; Dom: s.12; Gren. s.10; Guy. s.9; Jam. s.19;
Mont. s.12; KNA. s.12; St.L. Art.77; St.V. s.18; TT. s.19 as amended by Law
5/1950 s.2; Virgs. s.12; see also: R v REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES ex. p.
BOWEN (1914) 3 K.B.1161 on equivalent position in English Company Law. It is
submitted that a discretion similar to the one now enjoyed in relation to the
registration by a particular name should be given to the Registrar.
9 tAnt. s.43; Bah. s.15(3); Bds. s.19(1) ; Blz. s.17(1); Berm. Item 14 s.15;
Cay. s.26(3); Dom. s.43; Gren. s.19(1); Guy. s.17(1); Jam. 17(1); Mont. s.43;
KNA. s.44; St.L. Art.81(6); St.V. s.16(3); TT. s.17(1); Virgs. s.43.
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99R v REGISTRAR OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES (1931) 2 K.B.197; where
the Registrar of Companies in England refused to register a company whose objects
were illegal. The Court of Appeal of England held that the Registrar was right in
refusing to register the company. The danger in those territories that do not have
a separate Registrar of Companies is that irregularities such as this might well go
unnoticed.
100PEOPLE ex. rel. BARNEY v WHALEN 56 MISC. 278, 106 N.Y.S. 434
(1907), affirmed 104 N.Y.S. 555 (1907), 82 N.E. 1131 (1907); MATTER OF
STEWART v DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 22 N.Y.S. 2d 164 (1940), affirmed 23
N.Y.S. 2d 226 (1940); PEOPLE ex. rel. SIEGEL v LYONS 194 N.Y.S., 484 (1922).
tOIReport of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963).
to 2Securities Exchange Act 1934 (hereinafter Sec. Ex. Act).
10O3bid.
t04Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (hereinafter Holding Co. Act).
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (hereinafter Inv. Co. Act.)
10SS.6 Securities Act 1933 (hereinafter See. Act).
1061bid. S.2.
1o7S.E.C. v W. J. HOWEY CO. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). This is the most widely
used case on the definition of securities.
lOSSupra, note 90.
109Supra, note 85.
ItOSec. Act s.7 and the Rules and Regulations of the S.E.C., e.g. Securities
Act Release No. 4936, Regulation C.
ittitem 23 of Securities Act Release No. 4936.
lt 2Sec. Act S.8(a).
1thbid.; also Rule 460, 461 of the S.E.C.
1"4 Supra, note 40.
115Sec. Act S.4; S.E.C. v RALSTON PURINA CO. 346 U.S. 119 (1953). These
provisions are similar to those in the Commonwealth Caribbean. See: supra, note 38.
lt 6 Sec. Act S.3(a) (i1).
1TIbid. s.3(a) (2).
11Itbid. s.3(a)(4)
ll9Ibid. s.3 (a) (g).
120Ibid. s.8(b), (d). This corresponds to the discretionary power of the Registrar
of Companies in Jamaica. Refers to note 90 in text.
121Ibid. sll; See ESCOTT v BARCHRIS CONSTRUCTION CORP., 283
F.Supp. 643 (1968).
122Ibid. s.l1(c); see also Cohen "Investors' Protection in the United States,"
960 J.B.L. 105, 113.
123See material immediately following note 48 in text.
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lZ4Ibid. s.l; ESCOTT v BARCHRIS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
283 F.Supp. 643 (1968), also s.12(2); s.17.
1ZSEDGINTON v FITZMAURICE (1885) 29 Ch.D. 459.
12 6Refers to note 48 in text.
12 7Rule 425 of the S.E.C. The following statement has to be set out on the
front cover page of every prospectus in large capital letters:
"THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION NOR HAS THE COMMIS-
SION PASSED UPON THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPEC-
TUS. ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OF-
FENSE."
l2SIbid, s.24.
In Jam. the Registrar of Companies has discretion as to whether or not to
register a prospectus under s.39(3), but the Jam. Companies Act 1965 does require
a rubric to he placed on the prospectus once issued. It is a matter of speculation
whether an action for breach of statutory duty would lie against the Registrar of
Companies by someone who suffered loss as the result of a misleading prospectus.
However, it is submitted that such an action was not intended by the Legislature,
since what was intended was the strengthening of the investor protection provisions
rather than affording a new means of redress to investors who suffer loss as a
result of a misleading prospectus.
12 9Sec. Ex. Act ss.5, 6.
130Ibid. s.15. In Jam. the Registrar has no power to suspend registration once it
has been effected.
131Ibid. s.15A (added by the Maloney Act of 1938). In fact, only one association
of over-the-counter broker-dealers has registered, that being the National Association
of Security Dealers Inc. (NASD). Practically all broker-dealers doing general
securities business in the U.S.A. are members of this Association. See 2 Loss,
Securities Regulation, 1365 (2d ed. 1961).
132Ibid. s.12 .
I3lIbid, s.13.
134Act of August 20, 1964, Public Law 88-467.
l3SSecurities Exchange Act Release No. 7425, Sept. 15, 1964.
il6Ibid. s.12.
l37Ibid. s.13.
138Rule 106-5; FISCHMAN v RAYTHEON Mfg. Co. 188 F.2d 783 (1951);
KARDON v NATIONAL GYPSUM CO., 69 F.Supp. 512 (1946); SPEED v TRANS-
AMERICA CORPORATION, 71 F.Supp. 457 (1947) 99 F.Supp. 808 (1951),
affirmed, 235 F.2d 369 (1956); OSBORNE v MALLORY, 86 F.Supp. 869 (1949);
PARKER v BALTIMORE PAINT & CHEMICAL CORP. 244 F.Supp. 267 (1965);




-ORule 14a-6(a); 3 preliminary copies of the proxy statement and form of
proxy, plus other soliciting materials to be distributed along with them must be
filed with the S.E.C. at least 10 days before the final material is used.
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14t Proposals submitted by the security holder primarily to promote general
economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes are not proper; PECK
v GREYHOUND CORP. 97 F.Supp. 679 (1951); whether a proposal is proper is
determined by the laws of the issuer's domicile: Rule 14a-8 (c) (1).
142KAUFMAN v SHOENBERG 154 F.Supp. 64 (1954).
14 3Shareholders may also bring an action to enjoin violation of the proxy rules:
SHERMAN v POSNER 266 F.Supp. 871 (1966); UNION PACIFIC RY. CO. v
CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN RY. CO. 226 F.Supp. 400 (1964); KAUDER v
UNITED BOARD & CARTON CORP., 199 F.Supp. 420 (1961). See: 2 Loss,
Securities Regulation, 932-956 (2ed. 1961); the corporation itself may also bring
such an action: STUDEBAKER CORP. v GITTLIN, 360 F.2d 692 (1966); STUDE-
BAKER CORP. v ALLIED PRODUCTS CORP., 256 F.Supp. 173 (1966).
14 4 J. I. CASE CO. v BORAK (1964) 377 U.S. 426 (1964) 1555.





1 50Sec. Ex. Act s.21(e).
151Supra, note 149.
tS2EVANS v ARMOUR & CO. 241 F.Supp. 705 (1965); PHILLIPS v
UNITED CORP., 5 SEC Jud. Dec. 445, 460 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 90, 395 (1947);
S.E.C. v OKIN, 58 F.Supp. 20, 24 (1944); GRUBER v CHESAPEAKE & OHIO
RY. CO. 158 F.Supp. 593, 611 (1957).
153BARNETT v ANACONDA CO., 238 F.Supp. 766 (1965).
1 54
s.32(a). The shifting of the burden of proof to the accused in relation to a
criminal prosecution in respect of certain clauses in the Sec. Ex. Act has been
held to raise no constitutional difficulties: UNITED STATES v GUTERMA, 189
F.Supp. 265, 275 (1960). This interesting and intriguing point can well be taken
in the independent territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean, but has not yet
been so taken.
155Supra, note 58.
156LEAHY J. in SPEED v TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION DEL. 99
F.Supp, 208 (1951).
157"The proper test is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act
differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed
fact." To this there probably should be added: ". . . and the defendant should have
realized that he would be so influenced." See: Securities Regulation by Richard W.
Jennings and Harold Marsh, Jr. 2nd ed. New York 1968 at p.910, and their footnote
24 at p.910.
158S.E.C. v TEXAS GULF SULPHUR, 5 CCH. FED. SEC. L.R. 9225 (1968);
The fiduciary relationship exists once the person is an insider of the company:
ROGEN v ILIKON CORP., 361, F.2d 260 (1966); ROSS v LICHT 263 F.Supp. 395
(1967).
159Ibid.
160[1902] 2 Ch. 421.
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161[1942] 1 ALL.E.R. 373.
162S.E.C. v TEXAS GULF SULPHUR, 5 CCH. FED. SEC. L.R. 9225 (1968).
163This rule was enacted in 1942 some 8 years after the Securities Exchange
Act 1934. It was intended to protect sellers of securities against fraudulent practices,





t67LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP. v RATHMAN, 106 F.Supp. 810 (1952);
LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP. v CAMPBELL, 110 F.Supp. 282 (1953).
1681t has been held that the appropriate court is the Federal Court which has
exclusive jurisdiction over suits under the section regardless of the sum involved;
AMERICAN DISTILLING CO. v BROWN, 295 N.Y. 36, 64 N.E.2d. 347 (1945).
See: Sec. Ex. Act s.27.
t69A buyer's task under Rule 10b-5 may be somewhat more difficult since he
may have to establish fraud in order to succeed under 10b. See: FISCHMAN v
RAYTHEON MFG. CO., 188 F.2d 783 (1951) or may have to face the defendant's
use of defences similar to those allowed in respect of actions under Sec. Act ss.ll,
12(2) as ROSENBERG v GLOBE AIRCRAFT CORP., 80 F.Supp. 123 (1948). The
reason being that Congress could hardly have intended to "casually nullify" the
elaborate defenses allowed to defendants under Sec. Act ss.ll, 12(2). Indeed it has
been held in one case that an action by buyers is not sustainable under Rule 10b-5,
See: MONTAGUE v ELECTRONIC CORP. of AMERICA, 76 F.Supp. 93 (1948).
17oSupra, note 131.
17tSupra, note 129.
1720f course the individual broker-dealers have to register under See. Ex. Act
s.15 unless they fall into the categories of those exempt from registration: See
supra p.23. However, broker-dealers who are not members of a registered securities
association are also subject to regulation by the Commission: See The Securities
Acts Amendments of 1964, Act of August 20, 1964, Public Law 88-467 and Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7425 (Sept. 15, 1964).
173 See generally Jennings: "Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The
Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission," 29 Law & Contemporary Problems
663 (1964).
174 Sec. Act s.17; Sec. Act s.10(b) Rule lOb-5 s.15; KAHN v S.E.C., 297 F.2d
112 (1961); BERKO v S.E.C., 316 F.2d 137 (1963).
t751bid.




180 For proceedings, a notice of hearing is given to each party by the Com-
mission's Secretary a reasonable time in advance of the hearing.
tt t Sec. Ex. Act s.21(a). This endows the Commission with discretion to make
such investigation as it deems necessary to determine whether any section of the
Act or any rule is being violated or is about to be violated.
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lS 2Sec. Act s.8(e); Sec. Ex. Act ss.17(a), 21(a); Holding Co. Act ss.11(a),
13 (a), 18(a), (b), 30; Inv. Co. Act ss.14(b), 31(a), (b), 42(a).
183Sec. Act s.19(b); Sec. Ex. Act s.21(b); Holding Co. Act s.18(c); Inv. Co.
Act s.42(b).




197Sec. Act s.20(b); Sec. Ex. Act s.21(e); Holding Co. Act s.18(f); Inv. Co.
Act s.42(e); S.E.C. injunctions are statutorily created, and therefore the ordinary
equitable principles have been held not to apply; e.g. proof of irreparable harm,
or the inadequacy of other remedies is not necessary: See: S.E.C. v TORR, 87 F.2d.
446, 450 (1937); S.E.C. v JONES, 85 F.2d 17 (1936); BRADFORD v S.E.C., 278
F.2d 566, 567 (1960).
181bid.
139DECKERT v INDEPENDENCE SHARES CORP., 311 U.S. 282, 227-290
(1940): ". .. We think the Securities Act does not restrict purchasers seeking relief
under its provisions to a money judgment. On the contrary, the Act as a whole
indicates an intention to establish a statutory right which the litigant may enforce
in designated courts by such legal or equitable actions or procedures as would
normally be available to him." The court was here dealing with the Sec. Ex. Act,
but what was said equally applies to all civil liabilities under the S.EC. statutes;
CORPORATION TRUST CO. v LOGAN, 52 F.Supp. 999 (1943).
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196Al the S.E.C. Acts give the United States District Courts jurisdicton over
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the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties." DECKERT v INDE-
PENDENCE SHARES CORP., 311 U.S. 282, 289 (1940); Sec. Act s.22(a); Sec.
Act s.27; Holding Co. Act s.25, Trust Ind. Act s.322(b); Inv. Co. Act s.44; Inv.
Adv. Act s.214; See also UNITED STATES v CAFARELLI, 183 F.Supp. 734,
737 (1959).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
1971bid.
19SSec. Ex. Act 29(b); Holding Co. Act 26(b); Inv. Co. Act s.47(b).
t99 Sec. Act s.14.
200SPEED v TRANSAMERICA CORP., 99 F.Supp. 808 (1951); KARSDON v
NATIONAL GYPSUM CO., 73 F.Supp. 798 (1947).
201Ibid.
202
"On the basis that 'forewarned is forearmed' the fundamental principle
underlying the Companies Acts has been that of disclosure. If the public and the
members were enabled to find out all relevant information about the Company, this,
thought the founding fathers of our company law, would be a sure shield." L.C.B.
Gower "Modern Company Law" 3rd Ed. 1969 London p.446.
203" . . the great bulk of the regulation of the securities industry is self-
regulation under the supervison of a governmental agency." "Securities Regulation"
by Richard W. Jennings and Harold Marsh Jr. 2nd. Ed. 1968, New York.
204CARICOM is the Caribbean Community, including the Caribbean Common
Market established on the basis of a treaty signed by the Independent Territories
of Bds., Guy., Jam., and TT., which took effect on August 4, 1973. Sec. "The
Caribbean Community" by Caribbean Community Secretariat 1973, Georgetown,
Guyana.
205There was a meeting of officials of the "Research Project on the Harmonisa-
tion of the Company Law of the Members of the Caribbean Community, the Bahamas
and the West Indies Associated States" in Barbados from April 24-26, 1974. Attend-
ing the meeting were delegates from the CARICOM Secretariat, Brazil, Bds., Guy.,
Jam., KNA., TT.: Advocate-News, Barbados, April 24, 1974. It is hoped that the
necessary reforms will be urgently pursued.
